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Abstract
The question “is this system secure?” is
notoriously difficult to answer. The question implies
that there is a system-wide property called “security,”
which we can measure with some meaningful threshold
of sufficiency. In this concept paper, we discuss the
difficulty of measuring security sufficiency, either
directly or through proxy such as the number of known
vulnerabilities. We propose that the question can be
better addressed by measuring confidence and risk in
the decisions that depend on security. A novelty of this
approach is that it integrates use of both subjective
information (e.g. expert judgment) and empirical data.
We investigate how this approach uses well-known
methods from the discipline of decision-making under
uncertainty to provide a more rigorous and useable
measure of security sufficiency.

1. Introduction
Fundamental questions such as “Is the system
secure [enough]?” and “How much security is
needed?” have proven notoriously difficult [12].
Answering such questions depend heavily on having a
reliable and meaningful measure of security
sufficiency. However, these questions regularly assume
that “security” is a tangible system-wide property that
can be measured directly or by proxy. This assumption
has proven problematic on a number of fronts. Security
is recognized as an emergent property of a system [8]
[18]. That is, security arises in the complex interaction
of many factors across the system as a whole, and can’t
be determined by measuring the security of individual
components.
The difficulty of measuring security directly has led
both researchers and practitioners to try to measure it
by proxy with properties that hypothetically have a
strong relationship to security. There have been two
widely used proxies: the first is degree of compliance
to security standards, e.g., implementation of the NIST
controls such as those in NIST SP 800-53 [18]. It is
now recognized that this is an unreliable proxy.
“Security does not equal compliance” and the
correlation between the two is hard to make rigorous 0.
Another often considered proxy is based on the number
and severity of known vulnerabilities (or, alternatively,
weaknesses). Various scoring methods, such as the
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Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [5]
and Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS) [6]
have tried to account for the number and severity of
vulnerabilities/weaknesses in the system to arrive at an
overall number. However, again, there is no clear
relationship between this proxy and a useful measure
of security.
As with classic software quality attributes (e.g.
reliability), security seems to suffer the problem that
tangible and practical-to-measure indicators have
undeterminable or overly weak relationship to an
abstract system attribute. But this is not the entire
problem. Even if we had good indicators for security,
how would we know how to use them? For example,
what would the threshold values be for “good enough”
security?
In this work we investigate a fundamentally
different approach. We view security as a decision
problem, rather than one of measuring a property of the
system. Security decisions are made relative to what is
tangibly “at risk” and the cost of mitigating that risk
within the specific system context. That is, there is no
absolute measure of system security and of its
sufficiency. What may be insecure in one context may
be secure enough in another. Consider, for example, a
CubeSat, a small, relatively inexpensive satellite [7]),
verses a large, complex and expensive earth-science
orbiter such as the Soil Moisture Active Passive
(SMAP) satellite. One may be reasonably confident
that an open source real-time OS, say FreeRTOS, is
secure enough for use in a CubeSat, yet not be
confident enough to use it for SMAP. The
consequences of an OS exploit on SMAP would be
much greater.
From the decision perspective, security measures
are used to decrease uncertainty in the factors used to
determine the “least risky” decision choice for a given
situation. Accuracy in measurement is not as important
as how much uncertainty the measure can reduce, that
is, how much justified confidence it gives us.
Measuring confidence and risk from the decision
perspective takes uncertainty into account, and this
gives us better insight into the question of sufficiency.
If the decision is “too uncertain to determine,” the
uncertainty itself can be considered an insufficiency,
and the best course of action may be to invest in more
measurement to “buy down” the uncertainty. One need
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not have perfect confidence in a decision. Rather
enough so that the risk of not making the best decision
is low. This decision process will be discussed in detail
in a subsequent section.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we
provide some context, background, and prior work
related to a decision-driven approach to measuring
security sufficiency. In Section 2 we review some
definitions of security and make adjustments to orient
them to decision making. In Section 3 we investigate a
decision-driven approach to addressing security
sufficiency. In conclusion, we describe the research
contributions from this study. Both theoretical and
practical implications are discussed. We also discuss
the limitations of this study and plan for future work,
building on the results presented here.

1. Background and context
The impetus for this research stems from our work
on improving the cyber security of earth and space
mission systems, where we needed to: assess the
current security level of the systems, select activities to
improve security in an economic way (i.e., with an
understanding of cost vs. risk), and evaluating whether
the results were sufficient. As such, being able to
measure security sufficiency is central to our work.
Security sufficiency decisions are invariably
fraught with great uncertainties and complexity, with
risk falling on multiple stakeholders. Because of this,
important decisions must be made with justified
confidence. While when this is not fundamentally
different than many other kinds of systems sufficiency
decisions (e.g. sufficiency of reliability, safety, or
quality), the risk profile resulting from security-related
uncertainty is different and must be taken into
account. For example, with security, as with safety, it
is impossible to be completely confident in the factors
that determine sufficiency. That is, we may not know
all potential causes of failure – hazards (in the case of
safety) or vulnerabilities (in the case of security) –
along with their impacts. For both safety and security,
the likelihood of a defect becoming a failure and
impact of that failure tends to follow a distribution with
large variability and generally be positively skewed
[19]. But unlike a failure from a safety hazard, when a
security vulnerability is exploited, one must assume the
impact will reach its maximum potential due to the
presence of a persistent intelligent agent. One must
also assume that the longer a vulnerability remains in
place, the greater the risk it will be found, and when
found, exploited. Hence vulnerabilities have a very
different risk profile from safety hazards, and this
affects sufficiency decisions.

When making a security sufficiency decision, the
confidence we have in the decision factors is what
determines sufficiency. Note that high confidence here
means we can determine, relative to a given level of
risk tolerance, sufficiency versus insufficiency. Low
confidence results in indetermination, which implies a
need for further investment in reducing uncertainty in
the decision factors. Low decision confidence means
that if the “best” decision option is chosen, based on
decision factors that are currently known, there would
be a high risk that the decision would result in
unacceptable losses.
Unfortunately, current security metrics are
inadequate for addressing these kinds of sufficiency
decisions. Most software security measures are either
excessively pragmatic (e.g., they count detected
vulnerabilities) or excessively rigorous (e.g., they
exhaustively assess degree of compliance to the NIST
security standards). But while these may provide
insights into the effectiveness of whole processes, they
are not precise enough to measure the effectiveness of
individual practices and techniques, under specific
circumstances and in particular environments [16].
Currently, most software security metrics
focus on counting and comparing vulnerabilities,
measuring attack surface, measuring complexity, or
assessing compliance to a standard, and use some form
of checklist or scoring system. But measures such as
the average number of vulnerabilities per X lines of
code or the Microsoft metric, comparing the numbers
of vulnerabilities in earlier versus later versions of
software programs, have not proven useful for
indicating exactly how to reduce the risk of making a
“bad” decision due to the uncertainty in security
factors. For example, such metrics wouldn’t help
predict whether software that appears to be secure in a
development environment would be not be exploited
when deployed in the field [16]. When these unreliable
metrics are combined with limited budgets and
schedules, and the fundamental inability to provide
absolute security, they tend to render us unjustifiably
over-confident in making decisions on security
sufficiency. Furthermore, when security risk is too
high, it is difficult to ascertain the most cost-effective
security areas to address and the effectiveness in
options for managing this risk. Cost-effectiveness is
also a security sufficiency question [12].
The tangible consequence of uncertainty in security
sufficiency is security decision risk. As we show in
Section 3, we can measure this decision risk to address
security sufficiency questions.
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2.

Related work

Measuring sufficiency of security has been
investigated in both the information security and the
software engineering communities. The metrics
proposed are often based on or analogous to existing
measurements of quality, reliability, or safety. The
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Working
Group on security metrics and measurement seems to
be focused mainly on metrics adapted from the
information security community [9]. Others, such as
SAMATE [13], mainly focus on tools to help measure
security. The most comprehensive and closely aligned
work can be found within the Software Engineering
Institute’s (SEI’s) Cybersecurity and Software
Assurance Measurement and Analysis (CERT)
initiative [4]. This initiative is based on several
fundamental
security
measurement
efforts
[17][12][16], and it includes the Software Security
Measurement and Analysis (SSMA) project, whose
purpose is to aid decision makers with risk-based
assessment and evaluation methods.
The works referenced above, and the security
literature in general, proposes measures of security as a
system or process property (“capturing a concrete
attribute”) [17][16]. At the same time, these works
often view security as a form of assurance (e.g.
[11][17][12]). The concept discussed in this paper
differs in that we view security as a level of confidence
relative to making a decision rather than as an inherent
property of the system itself. This is consistent with
our view of assurance, in general, which we also see
inextricably tied to decision making [15].
Additionally, most security measures tend to “presume
innocence” and assume perfect security until the
elements being measured show otherwise. Our
approach is necessarily conservative. We assume
maximum uncertainty for any decision factor until we
have measurements that justify how much uncertainty
can be reduced for that factor. This is our source of
“justified confidence.”

2. Defining Security Sufficiency
As discussed above, security sufficiency
measurement is tricky. Perhaps a contributing factor is
that it is difficult to construct a meaningful and useful
definition of security sufficiency. In our review of
security terms contained in the literature, we noted that
the concept of sufficiency is frequently used without
being explicitly specified. For example, in the NIST
Glossary of Key Information Security Terms [10], one
definition of security assurance refers to “adequately
met” and “sufficient” numerous times:

[Security] Assurance - Grounds for confidence that
the other four security goals (integrity, availability,
confidentiality, and accountability) have been
adequately met by a specific implementation.
“Adequately met” includes (1) functionality that
performs correctly, (2) sufficient protection against
unintentional errors (by users or software), and (3)
sufficient resistance to intentional penetration or bypass.
It is difficult to measure something that is poorly
defined. We propose a definition of security
sufficiency that represents our interest from the
decision making perspective. While we accept that
there is no inherently correct definition, we find
validation through its utility in addressing security
sufficiency problems.
Complicating our effort to define “security
sufficiency” is that there are a variety of views and
definitions of security and security risk to which our
definition tries to maintain consistency. For our
purposes, we will consider the NIST definition of
security [10]:
Security - A condition that results from the
establishment and maintenance of protective measures
that enable an enterprise to perform its mission or
critical functions despite risks posed by threats to its
use of information systems. Protective measures may
involve a combination of deterrence, avoidance,
prevention, detection, recovery, and correction that
should form part of the enterprise’s risk management
approach.
It is important to note that since we can never know all
the threats or all the potential vulnerabilities, we can
never obtain a perfectly objective measure of
security. We address this by using an operational
definition of security that measures confidence relative
to a threshold:
Security sufficiency – the degree of confidence that the
security controls in place for this system will keep
losses from system vulnerabilities under an acceptable
level.
This new definition enables us to focus on a
measurable outcome of security decisions, namely
“losses from system vulnerabilities.” Moreover, we can
compare the expected losses from various decision
choices and derive the expected opportunity loss – the
additional cost of not making the “best” choice, the one
that minimizes the expected loss.
In this light, the “best” security choice is the
decision option that has the maximum expected
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outcome or minimum expected opportunity loss. A
“bad” security decision is one in which a different
decision would have been made had there been no
uncertainty in the assessment of security.
If we have perfect information, we could make the
best decision every time. Trouble arises when there is
a large amount of uncertainty in the factors that
determine security. Like all humans, decision makers
have inherent biases, which can lead them to make
biased and over-confident decisions in the face of
uncertainty. This is the decision risk we wish to avoid,
defined as follows:
Security decision risk is the potential loss of making
a bad decision due to the uncertainty in security
factors.
In cyber security, uncertainty often comes in the
form of unknown-unknowns (e.g., zero-day exploits),
because in a well-tested and managed system, the
known-knowns may have already been eliminated, and
the known-unknowns have been addressed through
analysis. However, we don’t take this as a given., We
approach system security decisions by assuming the
maximum uncertainty and perform investigations and
interventions to justifiably reduce this uncertainty.
We also realize that uncertainty cannot be
completely eliminated. Good decisions can still have
bad outcomes (through highly improbable “bad
luck”). Bad decisions can have good outcomes
(through “dumb luck”). But even though we cannot
completely control the outcome, our aim is to enable
making optimal security decisions, taking into account
tradeoffs
between
cost,
effectiveness,
and
operability. What we are maximizing is confidence
that our decisions have mitigated unacceptable losses.
The definitions given above enable us to make use
of a variety of established risk metrics, such as valueat-risk (VaR), to measure security decision risk to
determine security sufficiency. We provide a detailed
example of this in Section Error! Reference source
not found..

password attacks. Security investigations are activities
that increase our knowledge of security: these reduce
our uncertainty about the likelihood or impact of an
unacceptable loss from an attack. For example,
auditing compliance to the ISO 27001 standard or
performing a credentialed vulnerability scan [20] will
decrease the uncertainty that a vulnerability exists or
has been overlooked.

3. Using Decision Risk to measure Security
Sufficiency
In this section we will use the concepts developed in
Section 2 to build an example measurement of security
sufficiency for making a security sufficiency decision.
Along the way we will explore consistency with the
concepts discussed above and validation though
sensitivity analysis. While this example is
representative, it is not based on an actual situation.
Some considerations are necessarily simplified and the
data and estimates presented are only illustrative.
First, let’s consider some examples of the types of
security sufficiency encountered during a system’s
development and operational life cycle:
1. Approval to Operate (ATO) – Deciding whether
the system is secure enough to put into operations
2. Prioritizing Security Mitigations/Controls (which
mitigations or security controls to implement)
given a limited budget
3. Fix/no-fix decisions for individual vulnerabilities
or weaknesses described by scans
4. Incident response decisions, such as when to take
a system off-line in response to an attack
For our example, we will examine a system being
considered for release to operations and the approval to
operate (ATO) security decision. We formulate the
options in terms of security sufficiency as follows:
•

“Send” - The system is secure enough for
operation. Implement security as designed, release
system and monitor security.
“Hold” - The system is not secure enough for
operation or there is too much uncertainty that it is
secure enough. Perform security investigations to
reduce uncertainty or interventions to increase
security.

2.2. The Role of Security Activities

•

One of the things we want to know is how security
activities (our actions) can help us achieve security
sufficiency, as defined above. There are two general
classes of activity to consider: Security interventions
and security investigations. Security interventions are
activities that mitigate security risks by directly
reducing the likelihood or impact of an unacceptable
loss from an attack. For example, introducing 2-factor
authentication for user login will reduce the likelihood
of an intrusion from account hijacking or brute force

Our aim is to determine an optimal decision with
acceptable decision risk. To evaluate this decision, we
will need to use some indicator of security sufficiency
relative to the security controls implemented. While
there are a variety of indicators we might use, for our
purposes we will consider a simple Pass/Fail indicator
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where “Pass” means there will be no unacceptable
losses from a security breach, and “Fail” is otherwise.
The Pass/Fail state of the indicator is uncertain at
the time the decision is made. Indeed, it cannot be
determined unless an unacceptable loss actually occurs.
Therefore, we view it as a random variable whose
expected value is given by p, the probability of Pass.
This will be a significant factor in determining the
optimal decision. However, at best we can only
estimate p, perhaps with some sample data, and so we
must account for this uncertainty when determining the
optimal decision. We start by assuming the estimate of
p is completely uncertain (i.e. no prior information)
which we represent as a uniform distribution on [0,1]
i.e. maximum entropy.
Our technique is to use Bayesian analysis to
update our estimate of the distribution, based on
information from estimates of security factors for the
decision. The factors may be quantitative or qualitative
values (e.g., it could be based on expert judgment), and
these factors are also represented as random variables.
The information needed is how the factors relate to the
decision, which then can determine how the prior
distribution is affected.
The information is incorporated through Bayesian
updating, which reduces uncertainty in the posterior
distribution. As discussed in the previous section, the
information that reduces uncertainty can come from
either security interventions (directly improving
security) or security investigations (just learning more
about the state of security). In practice, we use
confidence intervals or Bayesian creditability intervals
[2] to represent ranges for our estimates of the security
factors.
What is the optimal decision, Send or Hold, given
the a-priori security sufficiency distribution? We will
define the optimal decision as the option (Send or
Hold) that results in the minimum median expected
opportunity loss (min EOL) for the decision. This
minimizes our decision risk.
To compute this, we consider the potential losses
given the various decisions and outcomes. For
convenience we will consider losses in terms of
dollars. We also assume the release of the system for
operation is expected to generate significant value.
That is, the desirable decision or “default decision” is
to Send unless the security sufficiency is too low.
TABLE 1 is the decision payoff table. It
summarizes the potential costs for each decision given
an outcome. If, for example, the system is put into
operation and no unacceptable loss occurs from
vulnerabilities (“Pass”) the table shows loss is $0
because all has gone as planned, nothing is lost and
there are no additional unplanned costs or losses. It is
the “default” or expected decision-outcome, because

the costs for this situation have already been allocated
and there are no unexpected costs or losses.
TABLE 1. POTENTIAL LOSSES FROM RELEASE DECISION

Payoff

Send

Hold

Pass

0

B

Fail

A

C

However, the table shows a cost of $A if the
system is put into operation and it unexpectedly incurs
an unacceptable loss from a security breach. In this
case, in addition to the security breach loss, there will
be the additional cost of securing the system against
future attacks, including lost time, while the system is
non-operational. Furthermore, the table shows a cost of
$B if the release is held up but subsequently no
significant security breaches occur. The losses are due
to schedule stretching and additional security effort
(unplanned work). Lastly, a cost of $C is incurred if
the release is held up for rework and it still fails
through a security breach, though a less severe one
than the one that caused the $A loss. The $C cost is
due to both improving the system and the later security
breach. To summarize the relative magnitude of the
costs: A < B < 0 and A < C < 0.
We need to deal with the uncertainty in the values
of A, B, and C. We do not have their exact values, but
we are able to reasonably estimate 95% credibility or
confidence intervals. Accurate and useful credibility
interval estimates can be obtained empirically from a
combination of sample historical data and expert
judgment. One approach is to obtain a triangular
distribution from worst case, most likely, and best case
estimates and from prior analogous projects then
compute the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles to generate a
95% credibility interval.
Finally, we focus on the uncertainty in the value of
p, the probability of Pass – experiencing no security
breach in the system. Again, we will express this
uncertainty as a 95% confidence interval estimate,
obtained from sample historical data and expert
judgment. We can now consider the Expected
Opportunity Loss (EOL) for each decision as the
expected cost of each outcome for each decision, given
the parameters A, B, C, and p defined above:
EOLSend = (1-p)*(C - A)
EOLHold = -p*B
The EOL is summarized for the release decision in
TABLE 2.
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TABLE 2. OPPORTUNITY LOSSES FROM DECISION

OL

Send

Hold

Pass

0

-B

Fail

C-A

0

In order to minimize decision risk, choose the
decision option with the smallest EOL. This gives the
rational decision criterion: The decision is to Hold
when EOLSend > EOLHold , which occurs when p < (AC)/(A-C+B), otherwise Send. This criterion is easily
seen to be consistent with our release judgment
because 0 < (A-C)/(A-C+B) < 1. If we were certain the
release would pass (p=1), the criterion indicates Send,
which is what we would expect. If we were certain the
release would fail (p=0), then the criterion indicates
Hold, again as we would have decided without the
criterion.
The important principle is that decision risk is the
potential loss from making a wrong decision due to
uncertainty in the decision factors A, B, C, p. If there is
no uncertainty in the security factors, there will be no
decision risk, since there is no uncertainty in knowing
whether EOLSend > EOLHold for the decision criterion.
However, if there is uncertainty in the security factors,
then there can be uncertainty in whether EOLSend >
EOLHold, potentially leading to a wrong decision. The
decision risk here is the potential loss resulting when a
decision is based on one EOL being smaller than the
other when actually it is not.
This “higher order effect” is not particularly
straightforward to visualize, but a practical
approximation is to represent the EOL uncertainties by
computing their 95% confidence intervals from the OL
model and the confidence intervals for the security
factors as described earlier. The decision risk is
indicated approximately by the amount that these
confidence intervals “overlap” each other. The more
they overlap, the more likely we may make a wrong
decision; the overlap represents an “area of confusion”
regarding which EOL is greater than the other. To be
more precise about this, it is worth defining the
Expected Decision Loss (EDL) as the expected loss
when we are wrong about the decision criterion
relative to a given decision, in our example whether
EOLSend is indeed greater than EOLHold.
Our goal then is to minimize the EDL, and to do
this in our example, we must have a rule for
determining whether EOLSend > EOLHold when there is
uncertainty. One possible rule is to say EOLSend >
EOLHold when median(EOLSend) > median(EOLHold) or
“the middle of the road rule.” We can then express the
EDL for this rule:

median(EOLSend) < median(EOLHold):
EDL = P(EOLSend > EOLHold)* EOLSend
median(EOLSend) > median(EOLHold):
EDL = P(EOLSend < EOLHold)* EOLHold
For the decision risk we need the probability
distribution of the EDL. This is a bit difficult to
compute directly, but tractable using Monte Carlo
methods. In order to make practical use of the decision
risk, we need to establish a threshold for how much
decision risk we are willing to assume. Our threshold is
expressed as the Value at Risk (VaR), the maximum
loss we are willing to accept within a certain tolerance.
It is common to select a 5% tolerance, which means
“we want to be 95% confident that we will not lose
more than $X (the VaR) from decision risk.”
What remains, then, is to estimate the decision risk
and VaR from the decision parameters, A, B, C, and p,
discussed earlier. We created a Monte Carlo simulation
for this calculation, whose outputs are shown in
Appendix A. Let’s walk through the results:
First, we estimate 95% intervals for the decision
parameters A=[-$2.5M, -$1M], B=[-$300K, -$100K],
C=[-$700K, -$200K], and p = [0.75, 1]. After
generating the distributions for the EMV’s, it isn’t
obvious which decision will have the best-expected
outcome. From the EMV’s, the EOL distributions can
be generated. But again, it’s not clear which decision
has the lowest EOL. The box plots of the EOL’s,
shown on the right side of Appendix A, reveal that the
median for EOL_Send is smaller than the median
EOL_Hold, hence our reference decision is to Send.
However, the large inter-quartile ranges in the box
plot indicate that there is considerable uncertainty in
this decision. The 95% EOL intervals show a
significant overlap so we expect a large decision risk.
The 95% EDL shows a VaR of about $188K, which is
indeed a large decision risk, and potentially we should
be willing to pay up to $188K to reduce it.
Finally, if we apply our decision rule “use the
lowest median EOL,” simulation shows what the
potential losses are from this decision for a given
release (not on average as with EDL). The 95% VaR
here is about $260K, which as expected is larger than
the 95% EDL VaR, since the variability for any given
release is greater than the variability of the average
over many releases. Because this is the risk for a given
release, it represents the value of removing all the
uncertainty, commonly called the expected value of
perfect information (EVPI) for the decision at hand.
Is the VaR for EDL consistent with our model
for decision risk? Let’s say that some investment in the
release improves our confidence in passing to p =
[0.95, 1], then the VaR reduces to about $37, or
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basically zero. This is consistent with decision risk we
would expect given that we are confident that it is
better to Send when we are pretty sure of passing.
Similarly, if p = [0, .5] the VaR is about $150, again
basically zero. This also makes sense for decision risk,
since we are less certain the release will pass than fail,
and the consequence of failure is very large – a
situation in which we are more confident to Hold.
Let’s say we are totally uncertain about the likelihood
of passing, which means the probability of passing
could be anywhere from zero to one, that is: p = [0, 1].
Of course the safest decision is to Hold, but relative to
the previous example we see that this decision has
significantly more VaR at about $55K. Here again, this
matches our expected decision risk, since if we have no
information, then we certainly should expect that we
could be wrong in deciding to Hold and will pay some
potential loss as a consequence. It is interesting to also
note that the EVPI here is substantially larger at
$256K. This too makes sense because there is no
“averaging” over multiple releases. A bad decision
here cannot be balanced with good (or more accurately,
“lucky”) decisions later. Hence the VaR for EDL
appears to be a metric consistent with decision risk.
The relationship between decision risk and the
confidence we have in the security parameters is not as
obvious. Figure 1 shows a sensitivity graph of VaR as
our uncertainty about p = .5 decreases (i.e. the credible
interval of p gets smaller) from total uncertainty to
total confidence. As expected, the VaR decreases as we
become more confident in the estimated range for p.
What is notable here is that the decision risk decreases
non-linearly. This indicates that if there is a lot of
uncertainty about p then even a small amount of
increased confidence can result in a significant
decrease in decision risk. It is also notable that when
p=[.2 , .8] (i.e. x=.4) is the “confident enough” point
where there is very little to be gained from increased
confidence. Indeed, looking the VaR for the EVPI at
this point is essentially zero indicating that there is
little risk from making the wrong decision (on this
given release) due to uncertainty. What is surprising
here is how large this range is indicating that we don’t
have to estimate p with great accuracy to determine the
best decision to make.

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

p = [0,1] -> [.5,.5]

Figure 1: VaR as x 1, p=[.5x, .5(2-x)]
Figure 2 shows a sensitivity graph of VaR as p
goes from zero confidence p=[0,1] to certainty
p=[1,1]. It may seem surprising that smaller credibility
intervals up to about [.7,1] have increasing VaR. While
the uncertainty in the interval for p decreases, the
EOL’s get closer and closer together where a small
amount of certainty making it more likely to make a
wrong decision. Averaged over many releases the
wrong decision will be made and losses will occur. At
some point we switch the default decision and the
intervals get very small while simultaneously the
EOL’s get farther apart making it less likely to make a
wrong decision. This is another strategically useful
thing to know. It indicates that increasing security,
which would decrease the interval for p, is not valuable
unless p > 0.7. Here again, when it is valuable, a small
amount of credibility can result in large reduction of
decision risk. Of course for a given release, the VaR
EVPI will not suffer this kind of sensitivity and the
more confident we are the less VaR as indicated in the
EVPI graph in Figure 2.
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Figure 4: VaR as x.99, p=[x-.01, x+.01]
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Figure 2: VaR as x
1, p=[x,1]
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This has the effect of shrinking the credibility intervals
of the decision factors A, B, C, p. That is, a decision
factor is more credible with security than without. It is
important to note that credibility increases (i.e.
uncertainty decreases) regardless of the outcome of
security activity. For example, vulnerability testing
will
decrease
security
uncertainty
whether
vulnerabilities are found or not found.

0.0
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0.4

0.6

0.8
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p = [0,1] -> [0,0]

Figure 3: VaR as x0, p=[0,x]
If we become more confident that the release will
fail i.e. p  [0,0] then Figure 3 shows that at about
p=[0, .2] we can be quite confident in our decisions to
Hold.
As a final sensitivity check, we consider a sliding
interval of fixed size (in this case, .02). This is to see
which range of p is the decision most sensitive.
Looking at Figure 4 we see that sensitivities for p
between .75 and .95 indicating that the decision switch
off point is somewhere around .85. That is, any range
that includes this point will be risky, so if we want high
confidence in our decision we should aim to obtain a
range for p of about [0,.75] or about [.95, 1]. Of course,
it may not always be possible to obtain one of these
ranges.
We are now ready to address a quantitative indicator of
security sufficiency. Recall that security increases the
confidence in the estimates of the decision factors by
providing evidence about the actual level of security.

Note that while all the decision factors are
important, we generally focus on p, since the decision
risk is more sensitive to this factor. Increased
confidence in decision factors shrinks the sizes of the
EOL intervals, narrowing the overlap, and thus
reducing decision risk.
This is really just a form of information buying,
where “perfect information” means no uncertainty (or
zero length intervals), which is generally impossible or
impractical to achieve in practice. However, in
principle this represents the potential value of security,
which we measure as the VaR discussed previously.
Given some security, we can obtain VaRcert or the
revised VaR with the new credibility intervals from
security. Hence we can define the Value of Partial
Information, VPI = VaR - VaRcert. as the value of
partial information resulting from the security
performed. It is the potential maximum monetary loss
that is avoided by security and thus is a meaningful
quantitative representation of its benefit. In practice we
are usually more interested in VaR/VaRcert for use in
cost-benefit and effectiveness of security analysis (it
avoids some issues of accuracy in cost estimation).
But how can we measure how much a particular
security activity reduces VaR? For this we look at
Bayesian updating [3] represent the effect of buying
security. As a simplified illustration of this, consider
the question of performing a credentialed vulnerability
scan (let’s call this CVS). Suppose that historically and
based on expert judgment for this particular release we
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estimate p = [0.75, 1.0]. On the one hand this states
that P[Pass] ≥ 0.75 and we are interested how this
changes given a CVS was performed. That is, what
does P[Pass | CVS=“Yes”] do to increases this bound.
Bayesian updating suggests that
P[Pass | CVS=“Yes”] = P[CVS=“Yes” |
Pass]*P[Pass]/( P[CVS=“Yes” | Pass]*P[Pass] +
P[CVS= “Yes” | Fail]*(1-P[Pass])).
Say we have reviewed 50 recent releases where
CVS= “Yes” and found of these, 30 passed and 20
failed. So P[CVS= “Yes” | Pass] = 30/50 and P[CVS=
“Yes” | Fail] = 20/50. Based on this sample data we
estimate that P[CVS= “Yes” | Pass] ≥ 0.82. The revised
interval p = [0.82, 1.0] gives a VaRcert of about $87K
and the VPI is about $100K. Similarly we can
consider how P[Pass |CVS= “No”] would revise the
upper interval limit P[Pass] ≤ 1 which would also
decrease the VaR.
In practice this example is a bit overly simplified.
Generally, there is large variability in the sample data,
which needs to be taken into account. It is also
common that the answers to the security questions are
not 100% confident. Typically, the answers are “Yes,
but…” or “Mostly No” with details on why and how.
Another issue is that risk and confidence are
frequently communicated qualitatively through “fever
charts” of red (“high risk”), yellow (“moderate risk”),
and green (“low risk”). Also a security activity (i.e. an
intervention or investigation) tends to affect multiple
decision factors simultaneously and there are not
independent of each other. Another issue is that the
likelihood of passing increases after Hold because
further testing and repair will be performed to decrease
this uncertainty. Finally, the default decision in
practice is generally “Partial” and not “Send” as we
assumed previously. To some degree these issues can
be addressed in the Monte Carlo simulations. The main
point of the current investigation is to see that a small
amount of information obtained through security
activities, such as answering the questions, can have a
dramatic effect on the decision risk which results in a
number of benefits.

3. Conclusion
3.1. Contributions
This study makes both theoretical and practical
contributions. On the theoretical side, using decision
risk provides an accessible means to analyze a
Cybersecurity sufficiency decision. The insights
gleaned also open potential avenues for further
research.

The practical contribution this work is its potential
to improve decision-making at NASA and other
organizations that have to make Cybersecurity
sufficiency decisions about complex systems.

3.2. Limitations and Future Work
The study presented above is conceptual in nature.
It identified the problem of determining security
sufficiency, of answering the question: “how much
security is enough?” Reviewing the literature and
current practice revealed flaws in the approaches taken
to-date. The study then laid out the definitions and
strategy required to measure security sufficiency. It’s
contribution was in changing the focus from abstract
system properties to risk and uncertainty inherent in
decision making.
The primary limitation of this study is that it has yet to
be put into practice on real-world systems – and this is
the goal for future work in this area. The strategy
described above can be applied to any internetconnected system, which provides value through the
network, yet faces security threats. The application
would be especially useful when (as is commonplace),
there is a limited budget for security controls and
mitigations, and it is critical to answer know which
ones and to what degree they should be applied.
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Appendix A: Decision Risk Monte Carlo Simulation Results
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